How We Evaluate Seed-Stage Consumer Startups

Inside our diligence process for mobile and consumer internet companies

Seed stage startup evaluation and diligence process

Venture Capital

Published April 2024  •  Insights WM Capital Team

Seed-stage diligence is different from later-stage diligence in every meaningful way. There is no audited revenue to analyze, no large customer cohort to survey, no competitive positioning that has been tested in the market. What exists is typically a small team, an early product, and a set of initial user data that is often too thin for statistical significance. The job of the seed investor is to make a high-conviction decision about long-term potential from this thin evidence base — and to do it quickly enough that exceptional founders are not lost to competing term sheets.

This tension between rigor and speed defines seed-stage diligence, and navigating it well is one of the core competencies of a good seed investor. At Insights WM Capital, we have spent time deliberately building a diligence process that is thorough enough to distinguish genuine opportunities from plausible-seeming ones, and fast enough to be useful to the founders we are trying to back. This piece is an attempt to describe that process honestly.

The First Conversation

Our first conversation with a founder is not a structured interview. It is a genuine attempt to understand who the person is, why they are working on this particular problem, and what they know that makes them the right founder for this opportunity. We are listening as much as asking — for the quality of the founder's thinking, the depth of their consumer insight, the honesty with which they describe their challenges, and the passion that comes through when they talk about the problem they are solving.

The questions we ask in first conversations tend to cluster around a few areas. How did you encounter this problem, and what made it feel worth your career? What does your target user look like, and how often have you spoken with them in the last month? What do your most engaged early users have in common, and what is the one thing they would miss most if the product disappeared tomorrow? What is your honest assessment of the biggest risk to this business?

We are not looking for polished answers to these questions. We are looking for evidence that the founder has thought genuinely and deeply about them — that they have a real relationship with the problem, real knowledge of the user, and real self-awareness about the risks. Founders who give practiced, polished answers without revealing genuine thought tend to perform worse in our portfolio than founders who are honest about complexity and uncertainty while demonstrating depth of analysis.

User Conversations: The Diligence We Trust Most

If there is a single diligence activity that we find most predictive of investment outcomes, it is speaking directly with early users of the product. We speak with users for every investment we make, typically five to ten users over one to two weeks, recruited with the founder's help from their most active cohort.

What we are listening for in these conversations is not a product endorsement — we expect active early users to be enthusiastic. We are listening for the specificity and naturalness with which they describe their use of the product. Do they use the product in the ways the founder described, or differently? Do they cite the benefits the founder cited, or different ones? How do they describe what they would do if the product disappeared? What frustrations do they have that they accept because the product is still valuable despite them?

User conversations also reveal things that founders sometimes do not know about their own products. The actual use cases that drive engagement are not always the ones the founder designed for. The users who form the engaged core are not always the ones the founder is targeting. The friction points that are causing user churn are not always the ones the founder is prioritizing. These revelations are not disqualifying — they are useful — but they inform how we think about the company's product-market fit clarity and the founder's user research depth.

Product Analysis: Hands-On Assessment

We use every product we seriously consider investing in, often for several weeks before making a decision. This is not primarily to evaluate product quality in a consumer review sense. It is to understand the core loop — what brings a user back, and what happens in the product experience that creates habit formation — at a level of specificity that is impossible to achieve through a demo.

In our product analysis, we focus on: the onboarding experience and whether it successfully communicates the product's core value proposition within the first session; the first-return experience and whether there is a compelling reason to come back the next day; the mechanics of the core engagement loop and whether they feel natural or forced; and the monetization integration and whether it feels like a natural extension of the product experience or an imposition on it.

For marketplace and social products, we pay particular attention to the experience of coming to the product as a new user with no existing content or social graph — the "cold start" experience — because this is where many consumer products fail to retain users who might otherwise be genuinely interested. Products with good cold-start experiences have thought carefully about user acquisition and early lifecycle design in ways that we find encouraging.

Market Analysis: What We Actually Do

We approach market sizing at the seed stage with deliberate humility. The history of venture capital is littered with investments that were passed on because the market size analysis was too narrow, and passed-over opportunities that later proved to be massive categories that the initial analysis failed to anticipate. We take market sizing seriously but we do not treat it as dispositive.

Our market analysis for seed investments focuses on three questions rather than a traditional TAM calculation. First: is this market large enough to support a venture-scale outcome if the company achieves a dominant position in its target segment? Second: are the structural dynamics of this market — growth rate, competitive intensity, regulatory environment, consumer behavior trends — favorable to a new entrant over the next five to ten years? Third: is the founder's understanding of the market dynamics sophisticated and accurate, or are there important dynamics they appear to be missing?

We spend more time on market dynamics and competitive analysis than on static TAM calculations, because the former are more predictive of long-term outcomes. A company entering a growing market with structural tailwinds can succeed even if the current addressable market is modest. A company entering a declining or structurally unattractive market will struggle even if the current TAM is large.

Reference Checks: Who We Call and What We Ask

Reference checks for seed investments are harder than for later-stage investments, because the relevant reference network is smaller and the professional history less extensive. We focus our reference calls on two categories: people who have worked with or for the founder in a context that reveals how they operate under pressure, and domain experts who can validate our understanding of the market and competitive landscape.

From professional references, the questions we find most revealing are: how does this person behave when they are wrong? How do they respond to significant setbacks? How do they treat people who work for them when things are not going well? How do they handle conflicts with co-founders, investors, or key employees? These questions about conduct under stress are more predictive of long-term company outcomes than questions about professional competence, which we assess separately through the founder conversation itself.

Domain expert references serve a different purpose — calibrating our market understanding and validating the founder's claims about user problems, competitive dynamics, and technical feasibility. We are particularly interested in cases where a domain expert's view of the problem diverges from the founder's, because these divergences often reveal important information about whether the founder's insight is genuinely distinctive or conventional wisdom.

What Makes Us Move Quickly

Several factors consistently accelerate our decision-making process. Strong founder-market fit that is evident and undeniable from the first conversation. User conversations that generate spontaneous, unprompted enthusiasm about the product. Early retention data that shows a genuinely stable baseline, even if the absolute numbers are small. Evidence of organic growth through word of mouth or community engagement, even at very small scale. A competitive positioning that we believe will be difficult to attack, either through proprietary insight, community moat, or structural distribution advantage.

We make faster decisions when we see these signals in combination, because we have learned that waiting for more data at the seed stage rarely improves decision quality but frequently causes missed opportunities. The founders we most want to back are in high demand, and being a thoughtful but slow investor is not a trade-off that serves either us or them well.

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